OFFICE OF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL
The Petitioner, Eddie Roberts, in the matter of Roberts v. LaConey (2007 WL 2479501), pursuant to In re: Unauthorized Practice of Law Rules Proposed by the South Carolina Bar, 309 S.C. 304, 422 S.E.2d 123 (1992) (UPL Proposed Rules), moved the South Carolina Supreme Court (Supreme Court) in it’s original jurisdiction for a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief regarding whether Glen K. LaConey (LaConey) had engaged in unauthorized practice of law. Roberts annexed copies of LaConey’s affidavits to his complaint alleging that Roberts and the amicus curiae, Bridgewood Homes, Inc. (Bridgewood) had committed fraudulent conveyances to hinder, delay and defraud LaConey. The Supreme Court forwarded copies of the materials to Judge John C. Few (Judge Few), Special Referee. Thus, the Supreme Court and Judge Few had knowledge of LaConey’s allegations, which were not refuted by either Roberts or Bridgewood.
ROBERTS ALLEGATIONS
Roberts contended that LaConey’s execution of a judgment, pursuant to an assignment of judgment in which LaConey shared the proceeds recovered with the assignor, constituted unauthorized practice of law.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On January 3, 1996, Paul W. Nickoson obtained a judgment against Eddie Roberts, d/b/a Eddie Roberts Auto Service. Nickoson later assigned full right, title and ownership of the judgment to Refunds Plus on August 17, 2004. LaConey was the sole proprietor of Refunds Plus at the time of assignment. LaConey, who always represented himself as the judgment holder, sought execution of the judgment. The assignment, which was not recorded in the record, notwithstanding LaConey’s time-stamped copies, recited in part: [A]ssignee, it’s agents, assigns and successors shall have full authority to settle, compromise and enforce said Judgment, and Assignor withdraws all right to same.”
On January 6, 2005, Roberts sought injunctive relief before Judge G. Thomas Cooper, Jr. in the South Carolina Circuit Court of Common Pleas for Richland County, Judgment Roll No. 203186, by alleging that LaConey had engaged in unauthorized practice of law. That matter had not been adjudicated.
LaConey subsequently obtained an order from the court directing Roberts to appear before Judge Joseph M. Strickland (Judge Strickland), Richland County Master-in-Equity on March 15, 2005 for supplementary proceedings. During the hearing, Roberts served his Supreme Court Petition and Complaint. Judge Strickland stayed the proceeding. Roberts omitted in his complaint to the Supreme Court that he had filed the previous action.
No petition or order of reference conferring jurisdiction upon the Master-in-Equity appear in the record. Thus, the trial court had no subject matter jurisdiction in the matter. Thus, LaConey could not have engaged in unauthorized practice of law by "filing pleadings and papers", which do not exist in the record, "on behalf of others" in a court which lacked jurisdiction to entertain the matter.
On April 4, 2005, LaConey filed his return to Roberts’ Petition and Complaint. Amazingly, on April 21, 2005, during LaConey’s supplementary proceedings commenced against Bridgewood on March 16, 2005, the Supreme Court granted leave to Bridgewood to file it’s brief amicus curiae. Judge Strickland stayed the proceeding.
On May 4, 2005, LaConey filed his Answer to Roberts’ Complaint. The Court, by it’s order dated May 18, 2005, appointed Judge John C. Few as Special Referee “[t]o take evidence and issue a report containing proposed findings of fact and recommendations to the Court.”
On July 12, 2005, Judge Few convened a status teleconference between the parties and Bridgewood, during which he directed the parties to seek written discovery. Curiously, Bridgewood sought discovery on behalf of Roberts in lieu of Roberts’ own counsel. LaConey objected to discovery by Bridgewood on the basis that Bridgewood was not a real party in interest in the matter.
On September 23, 2005, Robert L. Reibold (Reibold), counsel for Bridgewood, authored a letter to Judge Few in response to a purported letter he received from Judge Few requesting authorities supporting Bridgewood’s participation in discovery in lieu of Roberts. Reibold stated that “[a]mici should not assume control of the litigation”. LaConey did not receive a copy of Judge Few’s transmittal to Reibold.
On September 23, 2005, LaConey filed his motion to dismiss with supporting exhibits, which alleged, inter alia, that Roberts had previously sought relief in circuit court by alleging that LaConey had engaged in authorized practice of law; and that Roberts had failed to disclose the previous action in his Complaint to the Court. In his responsive pleading, Reibold referenced certain orders issued by Judge Few on “September 19, 2005”. LaConey did not receive copies of the orders, nor did the record reflect such orders.
On June 15, 2006, the Court, by it’s letter, requested the time Judge Few would issue his report. Judge Few failed to respond. In April, 2006, Harry C. DePew, counsel for Roberts, thwarted Judge Few’s repeated attempts to schedule a status teleconference with impunity.
After setting a hearing to be convened in Lexington County, the Court, by it’s order, dated July 27, 2006, acknowledged a letter authored by LaConey, dated July 20, 2006, which alleged, inter alia, that Judge Few had engaged in improper ex parte communications with opposing counsel and allowed Harry C. DePew to thwart Judge Few’s attempts to set a status teleconference. Amazingly, the Supreme Court ignored those allegations.
On August 14, 2006, pursuant to Judge Few’s ex parte request, Bridgewood submitted a “Statement of Facts and List of Authorities” to Judge Few on behalf of Roberts.
On January 3, 2007, Judge Few finally issued his report containing substantially the same arguments and authorities submitted by Bridgewood, in which he recommended that the Supreme Court rule that LaConey’s actions did constitute unauthorized practice of law. LaConey filed an exception to Judge Few’s report, which contained substantially the same matters herein; however, on September 4, 2007, the Supreme Court concluded that LaConey's actions, as outlined in this matter, constituted unauthorized practice of law. Amazingly, John C. Few is now the Chief Judge of the South Carolina Court of Appeals.
Arguments and Citations to Authorities
I. ASSIGNEES OF RECORD HAVE RIGHT OF ACTION.
Rule 69, SCRCP provides in pertinent part that the successor in interest of a judgment creditor, when that interest appears of record, may seek execution of the judgment. Amazingly, Judge Few omitted such pertinent authority from his report to the benefit of the defrauding judgment debtors.
II. LaCONEY WAS THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST.
The premise of the real party in interest doctrine is to prevent a multiplicity of suits against parties with a view to finality of the action. State ex rel. State Bar of Wisconsin v. Bonded Collections, Inc., 36 Wis.2d 643, 154 N.W.2d 254, 255 (1967). Tests of whether LaConey was the real party in interest are: (1) whether the assignor retained any vestigial right of action in the matter, and (2) whether LaConey’s execution of the judgment would end the action and not expose Roberts to subsequent action by the assignor. The fact is that LaConey, as the assignee of record, was the only party with standing to execute the judgment. The assignor retained no right of action. Thus, LaConey had not acquired a naked legal title from the assignment, rather he had acquired full and absolute ownership of the judgment.
III. ASSIGNEES MAY SHARE PROCEEDS WITH ASSIGNORS.
Judge Few cited the case, State ex rel. State Bar of Wisconsin v. Bonded Collections, Inc., 36 Wis.2d 643, 154 N.W.2d 254, 255 (1967) in support of his proposed conclusions of law that LaConey had engaged in unauthorized practice of law. However, it is well-settled in a preponderance of authorities, that any collateral, contemporaneous agreement that an assignee share the proceeds recovered with the assignor would not render the assignee any less the real party in interest. The assignee could sue in his own name whatever the arrangement respecting the proceeds. Id. @ 254. Although Nickoson did retain equity in the proceeds recovered by LaConey, he did not retain any legal interest in the judgment. Hence, Nickoson retained no interests that could be represented by LaConey directly from LaConey’s execution of the judgment. The arguments and authorities cited in Judge Few’s report pertained to “claims”, which have not been reduced to judgment. Additionally, by Judge Few’s own assertion, the assignment recited that the judgment holder withdrew all right to settle, compromise and enforce the judgment. However, Judge Few contradictorily presented that “[t]he original judgment holder retained an ownership interest in the judgment.”. Such misrepresentation was specious and unduly prejudicial. Mysteriously, Judge Few omitted all of LaConey’s arguments from his report and adopted Bridgewood’s arguments in favor of Roberts. [Apparently, Bridgewood had replaced Roberts as the quasi-Complainant in this matter]. Further, Judge Few omitted any reference to Rule 69, SCRCP pertaining to successors of interest of judgment creditors. Amazingly, Judge Few testified before the Judicial Merit Selection Commission on December 4, 2007, in response to LaConey’s complaint, that the assignment of judgment was in fact valid, and that he “[n]ever said the assignment wasn’t valid.”. Judge Few is now the Chief Judge of the South Carolina Court of Appeals!
IV. JUDGE FEW COLLUDED WITH ROBERTS AND BRIDGEWOOD.
According to counsel for Bridgewood, in his responsive pleading to LaConey’s motion to dismiss, Judge Few engaged in written ex parte communications with him and issued an ex parte order; none of which were delivered to LaConey, nor filed in the record. Further, Judge Few permitted Bridgewood to assume control of the litigation on behalf of Roberts, despite Bridgewood’s own assertion that such is improper.
V. JUDGE FEW’S REPORT WAS UNDULY PREJUDICIAL.
Judge Few willfully annexed copies of irrelevant and prejudicial communications LaConey sent to Roberts, despite Judge Few’s own assertion that such was not before him. Further, Judge Few’s disposition of this declaratory judgment matter was unduly dilatory, resulting in the expiration of both of LaConey's judgments. (What a relief for the complaining judgment debtors.)
VI. THIS MATTER WAS AN ABUSE OF PROCESS.
A. This action was duplicative.
Roberts omitted in his Petition for original jurisdiction that he previously sought relief in circuit court by alleging that LaConey had engaged in unauthorized practice of law.
B. Roberts and his counsel obstructed the administration of justice.
LaConey’s judgment against Roberts, for the sum of $7,587.67, with interest thereon, expired on January 3, 2006. S.C. Code Ann. § 15-39-30 (2007) provides that the enforcement period for judgments is absolutely extinguished ten years from entry of judgment. Further, the enforcement period can not be tolled. Home Port Rentals, Inc. v. Moore, 597 S.E.2d 810, 813 (S.C. App. 2004). Harry C. DePew, counsel for Roberts, reasonably should have known that his frivolous and duplicative actions would hinder, delay and defraud LaConey. [Harry C. Depew, Esq. was disbarred for committing forgery].
C. Bridgewood and it’s counsel engaged in a conspiracy with Roberts.
LaConey’s judgment against Bridgewood, for the sum of $8,100.00, with interest thereon, expired on October 30, 2005. Counsel for Bridgewood reasonably should have known that it’s participation in this matter was itself frivolous, and would hinder, delay and defraud LaConey. The specious, incompetent and frivolous positions of Harry C. DePew, counsel for Roberts, and by Harry C. Walker, Jr. and Robert L. Reibold, counsel for Bridgewood, constituted an abuse of process, which caused LaConey irreparable injury.
D. Such actions are fraudulent conveyances.
The Statute of Elizabeth, S.C. Code Ann. § 27-23-10 provides in pertinent part that suits filed with intent to hinder, delay and defraud creditors are clearly and utterly void, frustrate and of no effect; any pretense, color, or any matter or thing to the contrary notwithstanding. Such fraudulent conveyances may be proved by either actual or constructive fraud. In re Haddock, (Bkrtcy. D.S.C. 2000), 246 B.R. 810; and S.C. Code Ann. § 27-23-30 (2007) provides for punishment of parties to fraudulent conveyances; and S.C. Code Ann. § § 15-17-10, et seq. (2007) provides for arrest of persons who defraud creditors; and Rule 11, SCRCP provides for sanctions against parties and their counsel who file actions which are not supported on good ground, and which are interposed for delay.
E. Judge Few and the South Carolina Supreme Court were willful accomplices to fraud and obstruction of the administration of justice.
Clearly it was not intended that the Court’s directive in the UPL Proposed Rules be utilized as a mechanism to hinder, delay and defraud judgment creditors. Both Roberts and Bridgewood have, by participating in this matter, made the Supreme Court an accomplice to their guileful, covinous, and fraudulent acts and practices. Disturbingly, both Judge Few and the Supreme Court had constructive knowledge of such practices by virtue of the pleadings and exhibits filed by the parties. Hence, both Judge Few and the Supreme Court have aided and abetted Roberts and Bridgewood in their fraud. Further, Chief Justice Jean H. Toal, Justices John H. Waller, Jr. and Costa Pleicones, and Circuit Court Judge John C. Few have engaged in a conspiracy with Roberts and Bridgewood to hinder, delay and defraud LaConey. Such actions violated Canons 2(A), 3(B)5 and 3(B)8 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, Rule 501, SCACR; and unconstitutionally: (1) deprived LaConey of his property rights, (2) denied LaConey equal protection of the law, and (3) denied LaConey trial before a fair and impartial tribunal.
Corruption in South Carolina courts goes all the way to the Top!
